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The Nature of Law and Potential 
Coercion
KARA WOODBURY-SMITH*
Abstract. This paper argues for a novel  understanding of the relationship between law and 
coercion. It  firstly refutes Kenneth Himma’s claim that the authorisation of coercive enforce-
ment mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law. It then claims that the best way 
to understand the law is as coercion-apt. The “coercion-aptness” of law is clarified, in part, by 
appealing to an essential distinction between law and morality: Whereas it can be reasonable 
for the law to appeal to coercive means in order to motivate compliance, it seems decidedly 
unreasonable for morality to do so.
1. Introduction
Law coerces. This assertion seems banal and yet a debate concerning the concep-
tual relationship between law and coercion has been present in jurisprudential liter-
ature for decades. Of course, that law coerces is not the focus of discussion but rather 
whether coercion is a conceptually necessary feature of law. If X is a conceptually 
necessary feature of a concept, then X is an existence condition of the concept in 
question. As a crude example, a cause is a conceptually necessary feature of an effect 
because an effect cannot exist without a cause. Thus, claiming that coercion is a con-
ceptually necessary feature of law is the same as saying that the existence of law is 
determined, at least in part, by the presence of coercion.
There are different ways in which coercion can be said to be a conceptually neces-
sary feature of law. One of the more classic assertions is: It is a conceptual truth that 
every legal norm, R, is coercive such that R includes a coercive sanction for its viola-
tion.1 Another classic explanation is: It is a conceptual truth that every legal system, L, 
1 This claim is commonly attributed to John Austin, who identifies a law as the command of the 
sovereign backed by coercive sanctions. Laws are best understood as commands, as opposed to 
requests, because laws obligate the receiving party in a way requests cannot: “[I]t is only by the 
chance of incurring evil that I am bound or obliged to compliance” (Austin 2007, 84). Thus, a law 
has been created if and only if the sovereign issuing the command is both disposed to, and capable 
of, sanctioning a subject in the event that the legal requirement or prohibition is not satisfied.
*Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the Ontario Legal Philosophy 
Partnership Graduate Conference, May 2016; the University of Ottawa Graduate Students in 
Law Conference, May 2016; the Cambridge Doctoral Workshop in Legal Theory, August 2016; 
and the Edinburgh Legal Research Group, May 2017. It has been greatly improved by conversa-
tions had during, and after, all events. Thank you to Thom Brooks, Matthew Grellette, Kenneth 
Einar Himma, Katharina Stevens, and the anonymous reviewers for their time and thoughtful 
comments. Finally, thank you to Wil Waluchow for his endless support and guidance.
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is coercive such that it includes coercive sanctions for the violation of some of its 
rules.2 Owing primarily to H. L. A. Hart’s arguments found within The Concept of Law 
(Hart 2012), such classic assertions are generally taken by legal philosophers to be 
erroneous. Hart argues that the relationship between the concept of law and coercion 
is grounded exclusively in natural facts of our world—facts like resource scarcity and 
the fallible, selfish nature of humans. Coercion, according to Hart, is not a conceptu-
ally necessary feature of law (or of legal systems), but a natural necessity of our legal 
practices.
Over the past decade multiple works have arisen questioning Hart’s rejection 
of coercion as a conceptually necessary feature of law. Some theorists, like Ekow 
Yankah (2007), Andrew Stumpff Morrison (2016), and Joseph D’Agostino (2017) 
defend variations of the classic claims mentioned above. Morrison attempts to 
raise the sovereign from the dead and reinstitute the command theory of law, 
whilst D’Agostino’s (2017, 1) main claim is that the law, via legislators, inher-
ently intends to threaten violence against those who violate its norms. In his work, 
Yankah (2007, 1197) argues that “the ability to use coercion under special condi-
tions defines legal norms.”
As noteworthy as these articles are, Kenneth Einar Himma’s work, spread over a 
series of articles and chapters, is more comprehensive, and his claim is more moder-
ate. Contra Morrison, D’Agostino, and Yankah, Himma (2016, 594) explicitly denies 
the classical claims that coercion is a conceptually necessary feature of a law qua legal 
norm or law qua legal system. Himma’s claim, rather, is that the authorisation of coer-
cive enforcement mechanisms (henceforth CEMs) is a conceptually necessary feature 
of the concept of law qua legal system (Himma 2013, 2016, 2018, and 2020).3 According 
to Himma, the central function of the legal system is to keep the peace. Furthermore, 
“law can efficaciously keep the peace only by backing some legal norms with autho-
rized coercive enforcement mechanisms” (Himma 2018, 154). A system of norms that 
does not authorise the use of CEMs, per Himma, cannot keep the peace, cannot func-
tion in the way that law is supposed to function and, therefore, cannot be properly 
identified as legal.
The present work will argue that Himma’s arguments in support of a conceptually 
necessary relationship between law and coercion (so understood as the authorisation 
of CEMs) are unsuccessful. The thought is: If Himma’s more modest claim is not cor-
rect, then it is not clear how else a conceptually necessary link between law and coer-
cion can be supported. My suggestion is that, whilst the authorisation of CEMs is not a 
conceptually necessary feature of law, it is a conceptual truth that law is coercion-apt.4 It 
may not be immediately evident what the difference between these two positions is, 
2 This claim is typically attributed to Hans Kelsen, who argues that coercion is a distinguishing 
feature of legal systems. According to Kelsen, we should think of legal orders as directing legal 
officials how to respond when subjects of the law act in a certain way (Kelsen 1945, 63). So, the 
legal duty to not steal ought to be interpreted as stipulating which sanctions are to be applied 
by officials if a theft occurs (ibid., 61). For Kelsen, then, part of the essence of a legal order is that 
it commands the use of sanctions by officials.
3 Many thanks to Ken Himma for sharing the penultimate version of his chapter “Can There Be 
Law in a Society of Angels?” (now Himma 2020).
4 This phrasing is directly influenced by Leslie Green’s (2008, 1050) observation: “Law is the 
kind of thing that is apt for inspection and appraisal in light of justice; we might say, then, that 
it is justice-apt.”
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but the distinction will become clearer in the coming pages. On the theory I will be 
herein defending, “coercion-aptness” does not necessitate the presence of CEMs, nor 
the authorisation of their use. Rather, it is a claim about the kind of thing “law” is and 
the ways in which it is apt for the institutionalisation and use of coercive mechanisms. 
First I will elaborate slightly on the nature of coercion, itself a complex philosophical 
concept, in order to expand a bit on what is meant by the claim “law coerces.” Then I 
will explain and critique Himma’s claim that the authorisation of CEMs is a conceptu-
ally necessary feature of law. Finally, I will develop my positive contribution: What 
coercion-aptness is, and why law specifically is apt for coercion.
2. A Brief Note on Coercion
Coercion is often used in a vague sense by legal theorists. Typically it serves as a gen-
eral descriptor for the law’s ability to motivate compliance with legal requirements 
and prohibitions. However, coercion, not unlike law, is itself a complex philosophi-
cal phenomenon with a deep bench of literature devoted to it.
Consider the following scenario: A would-be robber approaches a man from be-
hind, holds a gun to the man’s head and says, “Give me your wallet and I won’t pull 
the trigger.” The man slowly pulls his wallet out of his jacket and holds it up until the 
gunman takes the wallet and runs off.
This scenario is generally taken to be a paradigm instance of coercion. Few would 
claim that the man decided to give his wallet away, qualifying the scenario by claim-
ing that he was coerced  into giving up his wallet. A fruitful account of the nature 
of coercion should be able to sufficiently explain why it is an instance of coercion 
in addition to being an instance of theft.
The task of isolating what it is about a certain scenario that makes it “coercion” is 
easier said than done. Conflicts in the literature are numerous, and some theorists 
may disagree on one point only to agree on others. For example, there is disagree-
ment as to whether offers can be coercive in the same way as threats (see Nozick 1969; 
Zimmerman 1981). There is also disagreement over whether coercion denotes success, 
that is, is whether the concept “failed coercion” is conceptually impossible in the same 
way as “married bachelor” (see Bayles 1972; Oberdiek 1976). Another prominent de-
bate is whether coercion is a moralised concept (see Frankfurt 1973; Nozick 1969; 
Oberdiek 1976; Wertheimer 1987).5
We can furthermore ask if the use of force to physically manipulate another 
as a mere means (e.g., manipulating someone’s hand to force their signature) 
counts as an instance of coercion. Again the literature is split; some maintain that 
the physical manipulation of another as a mere means is coercive (see Anderson 
2008; Frankfurt 1973; Lamond 1996, 2000; Lucas 1966; Yankah 2007). Those who 
disagree argue that any instance in which the agency of another is completely 
5 A concept is “moralised” if a moral assessment is a feature of its nature. As Hans Oberdiek 
(1976, 80) writes, “coercion embodies a moral assessment: insofar as an act or institution is coer-
cive, it is morally unjustified and therefore stands in need of a moral defense or excuse.” Thus, 
if coercion is taken to be a moralised concept, then the question of “wrongness” is not separate 
from the question of whether an act is coercive. It is not: Is act y coercive and, furthermore, is act 
y wrong? Rather, it is: Act y is coercive and therefore it is prima facie wrong and stands in need 
of justification (see Lamond 1996, 2000; Zimmerman 2002).
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neutralized (as in the physical manipulation of another as a mere means) is not an 
instance of coercion (see McCloskey 1980; Nozick 1969; Oberdiek 1976). Instances 
of coercion, according to this latter group, are best conceived as instances where 
the agency of the coerced agent has been substantially reduced or manipulated by 
a coercing agent, but not entirely neutralised. For legal philosophy, this schism is 
particularly interesting as it marks the difference between whether enforcement 
tactics like imprisonment, restraints, and barricades are properly identified as 
“coercive force.”
Yet another debate asks whether an instance of coercion is identified with refer-
ence to its cause (e.g., the actions of the coercing agent), or its effect (e.g., the pressure a 
coerced agent feels to comply with the coercer’s demands) (see Anderson 2010). This 
debate is of particular importance for this paper as it has interesting consequences for 
how we identify examples of the law’s coercive force. For instance, we can consider 
those occasions where a legal official acts with coercive intent, like when a judge 
threatens to further sanction an individual who refuses to pay an outstanding fine. 
Here, the judge is acting in her capacity as a legal official with the intent of forcing the 
defendant to do what the law requires: to pay their original fine.
We can also consider those instances where an individual felt pressured by the 
threat of a legal sanction and, correspondingly, altered their behaviour to keep out 
of trouble. Instances of coercion like  this probably occur on a near-constant basis. 
Anytime an individual behaves “otherwise” because they think the threat of legal 
sanction looms too large, it seems appropriate to conclude they fell prey to the co-
ercive force of law. However, the identification of such behaviours as “coerced” is 
problematic because of their subjective nature. Different people experience this sort 
of coercive force of law with varying severity, due not only to differences in personal 
psychology (including, but not limited to, phobias, personality disorders, and in-
tellectual limitations), but also to biological and sociological considerations such as 
race, sex, gender-identity, and socioeconomic status. As a simple example: A poorer 
person is more likely to feel coerced by the threat of a parking ticket than an affluent 
person.
Thus, pointing to an empirical outcome (e.g., a person decides to not park ille-
gally) does not guarantee the precise identification of the law’s coercive force. It is 
just as possible that an individual decided against parking illegally simply because 
they did not want to park in an accessible space, in which case the threat of sanction 
had no coercive power. In other words, such an understanding of the law’s coercive 
force (e.g., that it can possibly be identified anytime someone decides to act legally) 
makes  for a shaky analytic foundation. If, however, the focus is kept on those in-
stances of coercion that originate with a specific legal directive (you must do this, 
or face a sanction), as with the judge issuing a directive, we have an unambiguous 
notion of the law’s coercive force to consider.
The treatment offered in this section of the concept “coercion” and the ways in 
which it pertains to law is far less thorough than the topic deserves. For present pur-
poses, however, it will suffice, as it has at least provided a somewhat clearer sense 
of the  query being investigated: Is the integration of coercive mechanisms a con-
ceptually necessary feature of law? This is the query that Himma addresses, but his 
response is not simply that the integration of coercive mechanisms is a conceptually 
necessary feature of law but, rather, that the authorisation of their use is.
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3. Against the Conceptual Necessity of the Authorization of CEMs
According to Himma (2016, 601–2), the authorisation of coercive enforcement mecha-
nisms (henceforth CEMs) reflects, “the characteristic manner in which legal systems 
make threats as a means of inducing certain acts or omissions.” Before a legal system 
can authorise the use of CEMs, that legal system must have both the necessary in-
frastructure to make use of the CEMs, and officials who have the relevant authority 
to authorise the use of the CEMs (ibid., 595). CEMs are, for Himma, an existence 
condition for law qua legal system. Himma grounds his thesis that the authorization 
of CEMs is a conceptually necessary feature of law in a series of premises, which this 
section will show to be unfounded. Himma’s premises are as follows:
(i) The Hartian claim that the sense of “law” requiring explication picks out municipal legal 
systems in the modern state; (ii) widely accepted Razian claims about how our legal practices 
construct the content of our legal concepts; (iii) claims showing the centrality of [CEMs] in 
every paradigmatic instance of law we have ever known; and (iv) logical difficulties arising in 
connection with explaining legal normativity in a system without such mechanisms. (Ibid., 594)
Broadly construed, Himma’s argument progresses as follows: Per Himma, “Hart 
identifies ‘municipal law in a modern state’ as picking out the sense of ‘law’ that 
forms the subject of conceptual jurisprudence” (ibid., 598). From this observation, 
Himma goes on to claim that “Hart’s selection of ‘municipal law in a modern state’ 
as the subject of conceptual jurisprudence indicates the conceptual relationship be-
tween the notion of a legal system and the notion of a state” (ibid., 599). Himma then 
asserts that the concept of law qua legal system ought to be connected in some way 
to the conceptual function of the modern state, which, per Himma, is to provide effi-
cient social control, to “keep the peace,” so that a Hobbesian state of nature is kept at 
bay (Himma 2016, 2018). He writes:
Little argument is needed to see that these conflicts of interest [e.g., material scarcity, greed, 
selfishness] among beings like us in such a world are likely to become violent at times. It is this 
natural propensity for violence in a world like ours that creates a need for keeping the peace 
through social control. (Himma 2016, 601)
Himma is correct that “little argument is needed” for one to accept the claim that 
a means of social control is necessary for maintaining a relatively peaceful society. 
What, however, explains the link between successful social control and the need 
for coercion? For Himma (2018, 154), it seems to be effectiveness: “[L]aw can effica-
ciously keep the peace only by backing some legal norms with authorised [CEMs].” 
Granting such a link [that the need for social control entails the need for coercion] 
puts Himma’s claim in synch with Hart’s justification for what he termed a claim of 
natural necessity.
As mentioned in the introduction, Hart argues that coercion is not a conceptually 
necessary feature of law qua legal norm, nor of law qua legal system. Despite this, Hart 
maintains that there is a sense in which coercion is necessary to law. His claim is that 
given the natural facts of the world and the people who inhabit it, coercion is “natu-
rally necessary” to the function and practice of our law. By natural necessity, Hart 
means to pick out the way in which we need coercion not only to compel the compli-
ance of would-be lawbreakers, but to also provide a guarantee that those individuals 
who voluntarily live according to the rules of law will not be harmed by (or “sacrificed 
Kara Woodbury-Smith6
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to,” as Hart writes) those would-be lawbreakers (Hart 2012, 198). The relationship 
between law and coercion, then, is “contingent on human beings and the world they 
live in retaining the salient characteristics which they have” (ibid., 199–200).6
It seems, then, that Himma is not saying anything too different from Hart. Yet, 
Himma maintains that coercion (so understood as the authorisation of CEMs) is not 
merely naturally necessary to law, but is a conceptually necessary feature of law qua 
legal system. The leap from natural to conceptual necessity is granted by Himma’s 
premises (ii) and (iii). Premise (iii) is that the authorisation of CEMs is central to the 
function of “every paradigmatic instance of law we have ever known” (Himma 2016, 
594)—“central” in such a way that it would be mistaken to call a system of norms 
“legal” if they lacked such authorisation. Therefore, per premise (ii) (that legal prac-
tices construct the content of legal concepts), the authorisation of CEMs (as a central 
legal practice) is a conceptually necessary feature of law.
In order to unpack Himma’s claim that the authorisation of CEMs is a conceptually 
necessary feature of law, I will defend the following conclusions: Firstly, that prem-
ises (i) and (ii) result from misapplications of Hartian and Razian claims. Second, that 
premise (iii) suggests the flawed methodology of using empirical evidence to ground 
a conceptual claim. Lastly, whilst premise (iv) may flag an important concern for 
legal philosophy, it is not in itself a good enough reason to accept Himma’s claim.
3.1. Law of Angels
Premise (i), the claim that the central concept of interest for legal philosophy is mu-
nicipal law in the modern state, is relatively uncontroversial. The worry, however, is 
that Himma overextends premise (i) by claiming that the concept of interest for juris-
prudence ought to be restricted to municipal law in a nation state. In his own words, 
he sees “no plausible reason for adopting a concept of law that departs from what 
we are and what we do with the law”—here, Himma (2016, 603) is referencing Raz’s 
society of angels thought experiment.
In the society-of-angels thought experiment, Raz (1990, 159) asks us to imagine a 
society comprised of angels who “[lack] all desire to disobey their [legal] rulings.” A 
society built and maintained by such creatures, Raz claims, would need a legal sys-
tem to provide for authoritative norms, societal coordination, and legal institutions 
such as courts and a legislative body. Courts, according to Raz, are required for rea-
sons beyond allocating coercive sanctions, such as the interpretation of legal dis-
putes. Even angels, he suggests, could disagree over the terms of a contract, or be 
unsure who should pay damages if a tree damages a neighbour’s property. A society 
of angels would therefore also require laws providing for rights and duties, “[s]ince 
accidental damage might occur [...] from [angels] acting wrongly because they mis-
apprehended the facts or misinterpret[ed] the law” (ibid.).7 The upshot of the thought 
6 Coercion is not the only feature Hart thought was “naturally necessary” to the concept of 
law—he leaves that an open question, only wanting to point out that there is this “other” sense 
in which common features of law are related to the concept of law; that legal theory does not 
only have at its disposal conceiving of features of law as either conceptually necessary or not.
7 It is important to note that Raz denies such civil remedies count as coercive force because they 
are designed to impart duties on responsible parties, and not to deter would-be lawbreakers. 
Neil MacCormick (1982) supports such an understanding of the nature of civil remedies: That 
civil remedies coerce, he claims, is not an essential characteristic of theirs—what is essential is 
that they repair harm.
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experiment is that it is unreasonable to claim the angels lack a legal system simply 
because their system does not need to institute, nor authorise, coercive mechanisms. 
As Raz (perhaps infamously) writes: A legal system without coercive mechanisms “is 
humanly impossible but logically possible” (ibid., 158).8
Undercutting the effectiveness of the society-of-angels thought experiment is crit-
ical for the success of Himma’s argument. Recall Himma’s Premise (ii): “widely ac-
cepted Razian claims about how our legal practices construct the content of our legal 
concepts” (Himma 2016, 594). Himma supports premise (ii) by attributing the claim 
that “it is the core features of our legal practices that construct our concept of law” to 
Raz (ibid., 603).9 However, as was just briefly explained, Raz maintains that coercive 
mechanisms are not conceptually necessary in order to identify a normative system 
as legal. So, if Himma can successfully show that the angels in Raz’s thought experi-
ment do not actually have a legal system, then he can advocate more strongly for the 
position that coercive mechanisms are central to not only our legal practices, but to 
legal practices in general. And if coercive mechanisms are central to legal practices in 
general, then Himma’s premise (ii) will successfully support his overall conceptual 
claim regarding the conceptual necessity of the authorisation of CEMs.
According to Himma, morally perfect angels would only really need their nor-
mative system to solve coordination problems and make provisions to regulate dis-
putes. Such a system would not be legal in character because it would not need to 
provide for any level of social control. “Social control,” Himma (2016, 600) writes, 
“is only necessary where there is a significant probability of conflicts that threaten the 
peace among self-interested persons living together in a society of material scarcity.” 
There are, however, more types of social control than merely prohibiting or requiring 
conduct and, if we follow Raz, the law in the society of angels is a tool of social con-
trol—similar to ours—that grounds and maintains the organization of that society. 
That a legal system of angels is successful at keeping the peace without the need to 
authorise CEMs is down to the population being angels predisposed to doing not 
only what is morally right, but also what the law requires.
8 Despite the theoretical weight the society-of-angels thought experiment is generally given, it 
is not Raz’s argument that coercion is not a conceptually necessary feature of law. Rather, the 
thought experiment is simply an illustration of his claim that coercive sanctions are auxiliary 
reasons for action. The sanction, per Raz, is not a reason against a reason to act (the sanction is not 
an exclusionary reason for action). Rather, whereas the legal norm provides a reason against a 
reason to act, the sanction merely complements the legal norm. The general thought is that the 
coercive sanction does not enhance our understanding of the normativity of the law, because 
the person who is coerced into following the law because they want to avoid a sanction is sim-
ply avoiding a sanction. This is why sanctions, per Raz, are “reason[s] of the wrong kind” (Raz 
1990, 161). Wrong not because it is morally wrong to act on the strength of auxiliary reasons, but 
wrong because in practical reasoning the exclusionary reason is enough of a reason to refrain 
from acting in a particular way. The sanction, in other words, should not be necessary. This is the 
foundation upon which the society-of-angels thought experiment rests.
9 Himma does not offer explicit evidence for the Razian claim as he puts it, but perhaps the 
passage of Raz’s that he is referring to is the following: “The concept of law is part of our culture 
and of our cultural traditions. [...] But the culture and tradition of which the concept is a part 
provide it with neither the sharply defined contours nor a clearly identifiable focus. Various, 
sometimes conflicting, ideas are displayed in them. It falls to legal theory to pick on those which 
are central and significant to the way the concept plays its role in people’s understanding of 
society, to elaborate and explain them” (Raz 2001, 237).
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If Raz is correct, Himma (2016, 608) claims we may then conclude that “it is not a 
conceptually necessary feature of a legal system that it include a system of criminal 
law.” Himma takes this conclusion to be absurd—the law cannot claim to regulate 
conduct if it does not in some way prohibit or require specific conduct. However, the 
claim that morally perfect beings would not require a criminal code depends on a 
particular understanding of morality as both universal and static. Part of the reason 
a society of angels would require law, in Raz’s view, is that morality is at least partly 
underdetermined. Because there are questions as to what definitively counts as a 
moral wrong, choices need to be made regarding what should count as a legal wrong 
and there is no reason to think this would not extend to criminal law. Raz argues, e.g., 
that it may not be certain what constitutes murder as opposed to manslaughter; we 
know that there are differences here, but if the lines between them are indeterminate, 
then we need someone to draw them for us so that we all know exactly where we 
stand in relation to each other (Raz 1979, 245).
Perhaps an angel would never commit murder, but the point here is that not all 
questions of morality are as clear-cut as whether or not killing is wrong. To extend 
the point, of equal relevance are those factual disputes that need legal settlement. 
Whether a particular act, X, is an instance of some criminal category might not be 
obvious, and even angels would need someone to settle such uncertainties for them. 
Being morally perfect does not entail that the angels are perfect when it comes to 
empirical matters. It therefore seems intelligible to conclude, as Raz does, that even 
morally perfect beings would need a legal system to fill in those gaps that moral per-
fection cannot solve in society.
We can press this point a bit further by considering the Razian condition of com-
prehensiveness, which Raz takes to be a conceptually necessary feature of law qua 
legal system.10 By comprehensive, Raz (1979, 151) means to capture that quality of a 
legal system that claims the authority to regulate “any form of behaviour of a certain 
community.” Whilst a legal system that lacked a criminal code would lack a great 
deal of regulations that we take to be central to our legal practices, the lack of a crim-
inal code does not necessarily mean a normative system would lack comprehensive-
ness. Raz explicitly states that comprehensiveness does not require a legal system to 
regulate all forms of behaviour, only that the legal system claims the authority to do 
so (ibid.). The lack of a criminal code, then, does not represent a lack of comprehen-
siveness so long as that legal system has conferred the power to enact such norms on 
a legal official. As Raz explicitly states that the society of angels would have a legis-
lature, it is not a stretch to presume that such legal official(s) exists(s).
Worries about the content of an angelic legal system aside, Himma also questions 
how relevant the thought experiment actually is to legal philosophy. He writes, “it 
seems reasonable to characterise law in a society of angels as, at best, a borderline 
case of law that is significantly removed from the core cases of legal systems that 
construct the content of our legal concept” (Himma 2016, 604). Such a claim relies on 
a dichotomy between the concept of our law and a general concept of law that would 
hold in all possible worlds. He claims, per premise (iii), that the concept of law “of 
interest” ought to speak to what is central and ubiquitous to all instances of law that 
10 Whether the legal system of angels satisfies Raz’s other conditions, the claim to supremacy 
and openness do not seem to be an open question; or, at least, Himma’s work does not hint at a 
worry that either of them would not apply to a legal system of angels.
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we know—that we have ever known (ibid., 602). If it cannot, then how can it be of 
any philosophical use to us? However, what is missing is an argument for how claims 
regarding the “ubiquity” and “centrality” of certain legal practices, claims that can 
only be verified through empirical study, can promote an observation (all legal sys-
tems authorise the use of CEMs) to the level of conceptual truth (the authorisation of 
CEMs is a conceptually necessary feature of law). According to Himma, this is merely 
a conflict of intuitions: “at the end of the day, the dispute between those of us who 
believe that the relevant concept of law does not extend beyond beings sufficiently 
like us and those who do not will rest on different intuitions” (ibid., 604).
However, what the previous discussion on the society-of-angels thought experi-
ment has shown is that despite the fact that angels are very different from “beings 
like us” (because they have different motivations and require different things from 
their legal systems), they still have the need for a legal system and their need for a 
legal system is actually similar to our need for a legal system (to organise and struc-
ture society so that we can coexist peacefully). Therefore, the conclusion that coercion 
(or its authorised use) is not a conceptually necessary feature of law is not a failure to 
recognise the importance, or even the centrality, of coercion to our legal systems.11 It 
is simply a conceptual claim about law.
3.2. What about Normativity?
Himma’s fourth premise, that there are insurmountable logical difficulties that arise 
when attempting to explain the normativity of a legal system that lacks the authori-
zation of CEMs, is the most difficult to unpack. The claim that “law is normative” is 
how legal philosophers capture the sense in which law is action-guiding. Himma 
(2016, 620) thinks this claim requires philosophical explication, as “it is not always 
clear how to properly understand this claim [that law is normative].” He goes on to 
assert that properly explaining the normativity of law requires answering the follow-
ing questions: Firstly, how it is that the law provides reasons for action (if, indeed, it 
does do such a thing)? Second, what kind of reason for action does the law 
provide?12
In The Force of Law, Schauer (2015, 72–3) asks a similar question:
[W]e do not know how much of law’s effect on moral and policy attitudes is a function of law’s 
sanction-independent content and how much is a function of the emphasis supplied by the 
sanction. Could law have the opinion-forming or opinion-influencing it has, however much 
that may be, without the way in which the sanction arguably underlines the importance of the 
legal norm itself?
11 Frederick Schauer (2010, 9) claims something similar when he writes: “Without just that em-
pirical foundation, a theory of law, or even an account of the concept of law, seems distortingly 
detached from reality. It is central to Hart’s claim against Austin that the focus on coercion is 
distorting precisely because it ignores the non-coercive, sanction-independent, empowering, 
and non-hierarchical nature of much of law as it actually exists, but if it is grounds for criticism 
of a descriptive theory of law that it ignores dimensions of legality and legal systems that are 
widely present in the world, then it seems to be also grounds for criticism of Hart’s account that 
it ignores the coercive dimensions of law, dimensions that are no less real than the noncoercive 
dimensions that Hart properly chides Austin for neglecting.”
12 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this piece to discuss whether there is such a need to 
explain the normativity of law to the degree Himma takes to be necessary.
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We do not know what mechanism(s) drive the law’s normative force and, according 
to Himma, it is impossible to tell that story without invoking the authorization of 
CEMs. If the point of law is to structure and organize society, then that society needs 
to be able to trust that the law is able to motivate compliance with its directives. 
Many will be unlikely to generally follow the laws if they do not have some guaran-
tee that everyone else will generally follow them. In our world, Himma notes, that feat 
is impossible without the authorisation of CEMs. Therefore, Himma’s claim is that 
we can only sufficiently explain the normativity of law by accepting that the authori-
sation of CEMs is a conceptually necessary feature of law.
However, notice that this again presents a conflict between conceptual analysis 
and empirical observations. Himma (2016, 601) claims the conceptual necessity of 
CEMs is linked to the fact that “[t]he most effective method for deterring [...] con-
flicts, though it will clearly not always be successful, is to threaten a violent legal re-
sponse.” It is an empirical claim that municipal law in a modern state cannot 
efficiently motivate compliance without the authorisation of CEMs. But is it entirely 
accurate? Just a simple example to consider: Access to education has been demon-
strated time and again to dramatically reduce crime rates.13 While it would be very 
interesting to know, for example, the extent to which education serves to reduce 
crime rates compared with the law’s authorisation of coercive mechanisms, we do 
not have access to such data.
Furthermore, that properly explaining the law’s normativity is complex does not 
mean that understanding the reasons people follow the law is similarly complex. The 
observation from Section 2, that pointing to an empirical outcome (e.g., a person de-
cides to not park illegally) does not always guarantee the precise identification of an 
instance of coercion, can, I think, be fruitfully applied to this point. Different people 
follow the law for different reasons: Some may think an action is right (or wrong) 
independent of its legality; some (like the angels) think it is simply right to follow the 
law in general; some may fear being socially shunned for breaking certain laws; and 
yes, some will follow a law simply because they do not want to be punished. All can 
be true at once without all necessarily reflecting conceptual truths about law. From 
the standpoint of  legal philosophy, perhaps it simply ought to  be  accepted  that 
most people follow most laws most of the time.14
The question, then, becomes: Even if the threat of a sanction sometimes, or even 
reliably, serves to coerce a person into complying with the law, does that necessarily 
mean, as premise (iv) contends, that there are “insurmountable difficulties” asso-
ciated with explaining normativity in a system that does not authorise CEMs? The 
best answer here seems to be that it is contingent, i.e., dependent, on the facts of the 
matter. Of those legal systems that have authorised CEMs, it is utterly appropriate 
to say that the authorisation of CEMs is necessary to that system’s normative char-
acter. However, stating that the authorisation of CEMs partly explains that system’s 
13 See EOI 2002. Also, Bell, Costa, and Machin 2018 discusses the link between raising the age 
for compulsory education and the reduction in crime rates.
14 Those familiar with the philosophy of international law literature will recognize this phrase 
as a  reimagination  (or, perhaps, bastardization) of Louis Henkin’s (1979, 47) famous phrase: 
“Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time.”
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normative force does not mean that such authorisation constitutes the normativ-
ity of law in general—even if all the systems we can point to have integrated such 
authorisation.
A strength of Himma’s argument is the fact that all current examples of municipal 
law authorise CEMs and, as such, it is correct to conclude that the authorisation of 
CEMs is a significant part of understanding the normativity of our municipal law in 
our modern states. Phrased as such, however, it is a redundant claim and, per the 
previous discussion, when the concept of law in general is being considered there do 
not seem to be any reasons to accept premises (i)–(iii) as supporting the conclusion 
that the authorisation of CEMs is a conceptually necessary feature of law.
This is a significant impasse. For those who pursue the study of the law at its 
most general, beyond the confines of our natural world, it does not seem possible to 
defend the claim that coercion is a conceptually necessary feature of law. And yet, as 
Himma rightly claims, the relationship between the two is ubiquitous and we should 
be able to parse out why this is. The best we have, it seems, is to revert back to Hart’s 
claim that coercion is a naturally necessary feature of law. He writes:
[W]e do need to distinguish the place that sanctions must have within a municipal system, if it 
is to serve the minimum purposes of beings constituted as men are. We can say, given the setting 
of natural facts and aims, which make sanctions both possible and necessary in a municipal 
system, that this is a natural necessity. (Hart 2012, 199; Hart’s italics)
So, we can explain the relationship between law and coercion solely with reference 
to human nature and the needs of our societies, which furthermore means that inves-
tigations into the concept of law will have nothing to contribute to our understand-
ing of the relationship between law and coercion. And yet, such claims, particularly 
as justified within Hartian jurisprudence, are inadequate. In an early work, Hans 
Oberdiek (1976, 74) writes: “Even if Hart is correct [about natural necessity], this 
only tells us something about humans and the human predicament; it tells us noth-
ing about the concept of law.” The suggestion that coercion is a naturally necessary 
feature of law, Oberdiek points out, does nothing to enhance our understanding of 
the concept of law.
To essentially brush aside a consistently observed feature of legal systems as 
merely a human fact and exclude it from philosophical inquiry is a central worry 
Schauer articulates in The Force of Law (2015). It seems intuitively wrong that Hart’s 
claim of natural necessity is used by theorists to dismiss a seemingly universal char-
acter of law as outside the scope of legal philosophy, and it is these nagging worries 
that seem to be behind the recent resurgence in those works defending a conceptual 
relationship between law and coercion. The question, then, becomes: Is there a way 
to explain the ubiquitous relationship law has with coercion at the highest level of 
abstraction of the legal system, where not even the authorization of CEMs is a concep-
tually necessary feature of law? The goal is to provide an account of the relationship 
between law and coercion as originating from law, not from the human predicament.
4. Potential Coercion as a Conceptually Necessary Feature of Law
The core claim of the present work can be summed up thusly: Law is coercion-apt. 
Thinking of law as coercion-apt can give theorists a way to think about and discuss a 
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facet of law’s nature that legal philosophy has hitherto struggled to explicate. What, 
however, does it mean to suggest that law is coercion-apt? This section will fill in this 
picture by explaining what makes law specifically coercion-apt, and how this quality 
can help to further refine the distinction between law and other normative systems 
like positive moralities.
Another way to put the claim “law is coercion-apt” is to say that law is (in part) 
constituted by potential coercion, and the allusion here to potential energy is intentional. 
Potential energy, as present in a drawn bow, for example, does not necessarily result 
in kinetic energy in any conceptual sense, and yet potential energy both accounts for 
and explains kinetic energy when it occurs. Likewise, conceiving of law as being con-
stituted (in part) by potential coercion can help account for the seemingly ubiquitous 
institutionalization of coercive mechanisms without logically entailing the claim that 
the fact of coercion (or even the authorisation of its use) is a conceptually necessary 
feature of law.
The potential energy of a drawn bow is the consequence of the bow being pulled, 
generally by an archer. Accordingly, a bow at rest has no potential energy. Unlike a 
bow, however, the law does not require an “archer” in order for it to contain poten-
tial coercion; the law, unlike a bow, is never “at rest.” One way to cash this out is to 
appeal to the assertion that legal systems are systems of norms and the essence of 
a norm is that it aims to guide conduct. Legal systems, if we follow Raz, claim the 
comprehensive authority to serve as the supreme guide of conduct for all those who 
are within its jurisdiction, be they citizens, residents, or visitors. Because law claims 
this comprehensive authority, the law also assumes the dual responsibility of ensur-
ing compliance with its norms and protecting those who would voluntarily comply 
against those who would not. It therefore claims the standing authority to institute 
coercive mechanisms if necessary and—because of this—we can say it exists in a con-
stant state of being “pulled,” of being coercion-apt.
Contrast law to something like conversation, which ought not to be thought of as 
coercion-apt. Conversation, if we consider its typical use, is an information-sharing 
opportunity; its end is to make your thoughts explicit so that your interlocutor un-
derstands you. Conversation, then, does not have any underlying normative quality 
because the goal is simply mutual understanding. Even if a conversation were to slip 
into an argument, we should resist the urge to claim that such a verbal exchange is 
coercion-apt. The point of argument is to persuade, and for that you must (ideally) 
fully explicate your position to your interlocutor in order to convince them that your 
position is the better one. A successful argument would convince your interlocutor 
to agree with you of their own volition and, logically speaking, there cannot be any 
type of force or threat involved. So, if you were to say to your interlocutor, “If you 
agree with me, I will do X for you” or, “Agree with me, or else,” then the argument 
has ended.
That an argument can slip into a coercive exchange should the arguer become 
desperate enough to “win” that they resort to threats is not sufficient reason to claim 
that argument coercion-apt. This is because once such coercive threats are exchanged 
the argument has morphed into something else, something of a very different nature 
to “argument.” Contrast this to law: If officials trigger its coercion-aptness by institut-
ing coercive mechanisms, it does not make sense to say that the law has morphed 
into something of a different nature. Rather, the officials have tapped into the law’s 
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potential to be coercive. Thus, to claim that something is coercion-apt is to claim that 
its nature will not change if it then becomes coercive.15
What of positive moralities? Just as there is instrumental value in threatening 
someone to agree with you in an argument, there is also instrumental value in resort-
ing to coercive mechanisms to motivate compliance with generally accepted moral 
norms. And yet, despite this instrumental value, there is something distinctly in-
appropriate in resorting to coercive mechanisms within the context of positive mo-
ralities. If, for example, someone said, “We should sustain our moral practices by 
coercing people into complying,” a suitable reply would be, “But morality is not 
the kind of thing for which this is an appropriate option! Once you have resorted to 
coercive mechanisms, you are no longer playing the morality game and have trans-
formed morality into something else—something more like law.” However, if some-
one said, “We need to sustain our legal system by coercing people into complying 
because, in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, this is the only way the 
system can be sustained,” it would not make sense to reply that law isn’t the kind of 
thing for which this could ever be justified.
What is true at the most general level, despite the many different ways in which 
“coercion” can cash out as noted in Section 2, is that coercion is a distinctive way in 
which an agent is compelled to act. The person who is coerced is, in some sense of 
the word, forced against their will to do something. Morality, however, hinges on vol-
untary compliance and appeals to reason. Once coercion is co-opted into its sphere, 
it becomes something very unlike morality. Here I have in mind what Hart writes in 
Law, Liberty, and Morality (Hart 1963): that using coercion to enforce positive morality 
does not actually serve to preserve its moral character, but rather contorts it so that 
it is no longer moral.
Positive moral norms endure when they are voluntarily adopted, when those who 
adopt them do so because they believe such principles to be the right thing. This is 
why Hart writes that the preservation of positive morality is done through argument, 
advice, and exhortation (ibid., 75). He does not deny that coercion has an instrumen-
tal value where the maintenance of positive moral norms is concerned. Rather, Hart 
denies that what is protected or promoted is actually morality. He writes: “Much 
morality is certainly taught without [fear of legal punishment], and where morality 
is taught with it, there is the standing danger that fear of punishment may remain the 
sole motive for conformity” (ibid., 58). Moreover, if at a certain point in time the only 
motive for conformity with a moral norm is fear of punishment, then there is good 
reason to believe that morality no longer plays a role in practical reasoning.
Unlike positive moralities, at least as Hart discusses them, law is not primarily 
concerned with whether or not its subjects think it is a legitimate authority, or that 
what is legal is also moral, or even that doing the legal thing is the same as doing the 
“right thing.” Law, especially if we focus on duty-imposing norms, is very concerned 
with compliance. The law, however, is more than duty-imposing norms; how, then, 
15 It seems, then, that aptness is nothing more than that which is possible. A car can be blue or 
not blue and its nature will not change; is it correct to say that a car is blue-apt? I do not mean 
coercion-aptness to be as anaemic as that and yet, there does seem to be something about the 
nature of a car that it is apt to be decorated, to be customised. It has the potential to be blue, or 
yellow, or red, or wrapped in a metallic or matte film, etc. Aptness may, at its most crude, be 
reduced to mere possibility, but I mean for it to signal something more like a disposition.
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is the claim that law is coercion-apt connected to power-conferring legal norms? It 
seems immediately apparent that it would be strange for the law to coerce a subject to 
exercise a power-conferring norm. Indeed, in contract law it is illegal to coerce some-
one into entering into contract with you. However, in exercising some power-confer-
ring legal norms, one can expand their legal duties, and it seems correct to claim that 
duties generated by power-conferring legal norms are coercion-apt.
Can coercion-aptness also serve to distinguish law from social conventions? To 
be sure, societal pressures exist as a way to force compliance with various social 
conventions, and some of those societal pressures can feel coercive. Perhaps, how-
ever, the same inappropriateness that attaches to morality when coercive means are 
considered also attaches to social conventions? The point being advanced, then, is 
not that only law is coercion-apt, but that there is a distinction in appropriateness be-
tween the realms of morality and social conventions on the one side and law on the 
other where coercive mechanisms are concerned. And the distinction is such that one 
ought to be hesitant to bestow the characteristic “coercion-apt” on either morality or 
social conventions.
It is also important to consider whether the law is apt for any other types of mo-
tivation, or if coercion is a type of motivation distinctly appropriate to law in a way 
other means of motivating compliance are not. For example, some people may be 
motivated to follow the law only because they fear societal repercussions, like harm 
to their reputation. However, we cannot discuss the ways in which the law is apt to 
protect reputations in the same way it is coercion-apt because the law cannot inten-
tionally generate social pressures in the same way that it can intentionally generate 
coercive mechanisms. Societal pressures to follow the law—or even to break the law, 
as in occurrences of civil disobedience—are not grounded in legal mechanisms, but 
in societal norms and opinions. Societal pressures may converge with legal norms, 
but such convergence is not necessary, nor even predictable.
Rewards can also motivate compliance with norms, so is law reward-apt in the 
same way that it is coercion-apt? Rewards can serve as powerful incentives, but as 
Bentham (1970, 134–6) points out, a reward-based system of law could not be de-
pended on and would look quite absurd. For example, if a reward for not stealing 
were offered, would individuals be paid per day they did not commit an offense? For 
every time you do not steal, are you to be rewarded a credit to the store in question? 
Would rewards be universally applied, or only issued to those who have broken laws 
in the past in an effort to get them to “reform”? And, if in the latter case, wouldn’t 
such a system lead to more lawbreaking because everyone would want to claim 
rewards?16
It is true that the law can piggy-back off of reputational or moral motivations, and 
can motivate compliance by offering rewards. However, the point being pressed in 
this section is the following: What makes law distinctive from morality is that moral 
norms are not apt for invoking coercive force in order to motivate behaviours in the 
same way as legal norms. It is not an open question whether moral norms can be 
enforced coercively, because morality is the kind of thing that excludes resorting to 
16 This, of course, only serves to highlight the practical difficulties associated with rewards as 
the primary means of motivating compliance with the law and does not offer a substantive ar-
gument for why law is not reward-apt in the same way as I argue it is coercion-apt.
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coercion. When it comes to law, however, such questions relating to the incorporation 
of coercive mechanisms are always live.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I set out to explain, firstly, that coercion is not a conceptually necessary 
feature of law, and second, that coercion-aptness is a conceptually necessary feature 
of law. Thus, the claim being promoted is that “law” and “coercion-aptness” are con-
ceptually connected in the sense that we would not identify L as an instance of law 
were we not also able to identify L as coercion-apt. As explained in the previous 
section, conceiving of law as coercion-apt can help to distinguish law from moral-
ity: Moral norms are duty-imposing, but are not coercion-apt because the character 
of morality is such that it would contort its nature to resort to coercion to motivate 
compliance with its directives.
If we return to the society of angels, the claim “law is coercion-apt” can also de-
velop Hart’s claim that coercion is naturally necessary to law. Yankah writes that the 
thought experiment should cast serious doubts on whether the angels actually have 
a legal system:
If one (fallen) angel inexplicably decided to disobey those edicts, the inability of any structure 
to even theoretically compel him to do so would, I suggest, cast serious doubt on the system’s 
claim to be law. (Yankah 2007, 1236)
Casting doubt on the legality of the angels’ system of norms, however, is not the only 
possibility. As Green (2016, 167) points out: “Even the angelic legal system contains 
all the powers necessary to get a coercive apparatus up and running in short order. 
It is unusual only in that it does not use its necessary powers in that way.” The lack 
of a coercive mechanism in a society of angles is not evidence that the angels lack a 
legal system, but rather is evidence that either the legislature has not yet conferred 
the relevant powers on certain legal official(s), or the powers have been conferred, 
but not yet exercised. One could therefore respond to Yankah’s worry by claiming 
that the fallen angel has simply given the relevant official(s) of such a legal system 
a very good reason to trigger the coercion-aptness of their legal system and create, 
authorize, and enact coercive mechanisms.
Moreover, were the angel-officials to institutionalise coercive mechanisms in an 
attempt to redeem the fallen angel, the possibility exists that they would be instru-
mentally justified in doing so because it would be a productive measure to take in 
securing the desired aim of successfully motivating the compliance of the fallen angel 
and protecting the law-abiding angels from other fallen angels. It seems correct to 
borrow from Hart’s original statement of natural necessity and say that considering 
law’s nature (and its claim to normative authority in particular), authorising coer-
cive mechanisms is not only instrumentally justified, but is also an instrumentally 
optimal way to maintain the rule of law. This is not a moral claim, as instrumental 
value is independent of moral value. There are obvious examples of wicked legal 
systems, and wicked laws, for which there can be no moral justification for the use of 
institutional coercion. And yet, there is a sense in which it is instrumentally justified 
for even a wicked legal system to authorise coercive mechanisms to sustain the rule 
of its law.
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Adequately accounting for the relationship between law and coercion is signif-
icant for legal philosophy beyond analysing the concept of law. One such implica-
tion concerns the philosophy of international law and whether international law 
so called is really law. One of the central criticisms of conceiving of international 
law as law properly so called (to echo John Austin) is that international law is 
unenforceable. This, the claim goes, is primarily because what is taken to be in-
ternational law lacks the systemic qualities of most municipal legal systems, like 
institutionalised coercive mechanisms. However, if the claim “law is coercion-apt” 
is generally acceptable, then international law may well be a full instance of law 
even in the absence of any such mechanisms. The focus will no longer be on the 
absence of coercive mechanisms (an absence that might well be explained by any 
number of moral, historical, practical, or economic reasons), but on whether in-
ternational law is coercion-apt. In other words, is it recognized as an institution 
in respect to which resorting to the use of coercive mechanisms is conceptually 
appropriate, and possibly justified?
Recognizing the conceptual connection between law and coercion-aptness has a 
number of other potential benefits aside from supporting the claim that international 
law is “law.” As mentioned, it can help to make sense of the Hartian picture, whilst 
simultaneously building upon it. One of the relationships Hart sought to clarify in 
his work was that of law and coercion. He ultimately determined that they, like law 
and morality, are conceptually distinct. Coercion-aptness not only confirms this con-
ceptual separability, but also acknowledges that the concept of law, distinct from hu-
mans, has an innate capacity to be coercive. Second, understanding the relationship 
between law and coercion as suggested could make it possible for legal philosophy to 
re-evaluate questions of pluralism, of the nature and role legal officials, and of legal 
systems with greater precision. This is because the focus is on the aptness a normative 
system in question has for the institutionalisation of coercive mechanisms, and not 
on the fact of their existence.
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